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REVIUW OF R]"1=NT DCIBIONS 141
Revenue, at the time he maked *be demand upom the taxpayer, should send a
copy of the demand to some office in wbich liens upo= real estate are re-
corded and "the records of which are consequently carefully examined by cob-
veyancers.!
PLEADING--"REAL PARTY IN INTEREST"--SUBROGATION OF
INSURER.
The case of Sexton v. Anderson Electric Car Co., 234 S. W. 358, was a
suit to recover damages for injury to an electric automobile. The owner had
taken the car to defendant's place of business for inspection and overhauling.
Previous to its return employees of defendant while testing it out collided with
a lamp post wrecking the car. At the time of collision the owner carried
$1,800 insurance on the car to cover loss restting from such accidents. This
amount was paid to owner by the Insurance Company and he transferred all
his right, title, and interest in and to the wrecked car to the Insurarce Com-
pany. The insurance policy contained a stipulation that in case the Insurance
Company paid a loss as stated above they would be subrogated to all the rights
of owner of car in an action for damages against any third party, and that such
action should be brought in the name of the owner of the car. In accordance
with this stipulation the Insurance Company brought a suit in the name of the
car owner against the third party resulting in a verdict for plaintiff. After
the overruling of a motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Defendant
claimed the court erred in refusing to give the peremptory inmtructim to the
effect that the owner was not the "real party in interest!' Upon being ques-
tioned, the owner of car said that after he had received the money from the
Insurance Company he had no interest in the result of the lawsuit; that he
claimed no right of action personally and that he considered the action brought
for the benefit of the company. It would seem that altho the company could
properly bring such an action they should bring it in their own name and not
in the name of the owner of the car.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the bringing of suit in the name
of the owner of car was proper and Ithe judgment 'of the lower court was af-
firmed. The Judge in the opinion cited a number of cases supporting the doc-
trine of subrogation in cases such as the one under consideration. Railway Co.
v. Blunt & Ward (C. C.) 165 Fed. loc. cit. 260; Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc.
v. Standard Oil Company, 59 Fed. 987; Foster v. Railway, 143 Mo. ApM. 547;
Matthews v. Railroad, 142 Mo. 645. There can be no doubt as to the doctrine
of subrogation set forth i the above cases or in the case of Sexton Y. Ander-
son Electric Car Co., 234 S. W. 358, but there might possibly be a question as
to why in that case action was not brought in the name of the Insurance Com-
pany rather than the owner of the car. At common law this would have been
the action since it had to be brought in the name of the assured. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Railway Co., 74 Mo. App. 106, and L. & G. W. Steam-
ship Cx, v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, are cases similar to above, both
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supporting the doctrine of subrogation, but action was not instituted in the
name of the owner of the injured goods but in the name of the Insurance Com-
pany. A case n point with the main case under consideration is Luke Hart et
al. v. The Western Railroad Corporation, 13 Mot. (Mass.) 99inwhich it was held
that the Insurarce Company might bring an action in the name of the owner
of the injured goods or property. In Sexton v. Anderson Electric Car Co.,
234 S. W. 358, it was possibiy due to the stipulation in the policy that action
might be brought by the Insurance Company in the name of the owner of the
car that influenced the Judge in affirming the decision of the lower court.
FLEADING--SUFFICIENCY OF NEGLIGENCE PLEAD GENERAI.LY.
In the case of Van Bibber v. Willman Fruit Co., 234 S. W. 356, the serv-
ants of defendant company negligently and carelessly ran a large automobile
truck into a horse, wagon and harness belonging to plaintiff, destroying the
wagon and harness and injuring the horse. Plaintiff brought action alleging that
"defendant company, its agents and scrvants, carelessly and negfgently ran a
large automobile truck, being then and there used in its business, against and
upon the wagon, horse and harness" and praying judgment in the sum of $200.
To this petition defendant filed a motion to make definite and certain. Plain-
tiff failed to do so and the petition was dismizse& In the Supreme Court the
view of the lower cnuft was affirmed holding that it was proper for the de-
fendant to ask that the facts which plaintiff claimed to constitute negligence
should be pleaded. The reason for this being to advise the defendant of the
particular acts of negligence which he would be expected to meet in defense.
Bliss on Code Pleading (3rd Ed.) Secs. 135-140; Shohoney v. Railroad, 223
Mo. 649. From a review of other authorities it would seem that there might
be a difference of opinion upon the point involved in the main case under con-
sideration. In the case of Mack v. St. Louis, K. C. & B. Railway Co., 77 Mo.
232, in which plaintiff's horse was killed by defendant's locomotive, and where
it was merely alleged that defendant "negligently killed" pla'ntiff's horse with-
out setting out facts constituting negligence, the court held that this was a
sufficient pleading of negligence. Another case, Senate v. Chicago, M. & St.
Paul Ralway Co, 57 Mo. App. 223, in which plaintiff's horse was killed by
defendant railroad, the alleging of negligence generally was held sufficient, the
Court saying, "It has been repeatedly declared that a general averment of neg-
ligence is sufficient, and that an allegation specifying the act, the doing o
which caused the injury, and averring that it was negligensly and carelessly
done, will suffice." This view is also supported in Sullivan v. Railroad, 97 Mo.
113; Pope v. Cable Railway Co., 99 Mo. 400; and I McQuillin's Pleading and
Pmct
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